Russia and China’s nuclear expansion is forcing U.S. defense leaders to consider reactivating Army-controlled tactical nuclear weapons.
At a Glance
- Russia and China are aggressively modernizing their nuclear arsenals, shifting the global balance
- The U.S. Army gave up its nuclear role after the Cold War but may rejoin to address strategic gaps
- Russia’s non-strategic nuclear forces outnumber U.S. equivalents by 10 to 1
- China’s arsenal is growing faster than expected, challenging U.S. deterrence in the Indo-Pacific
- Analysts argue reintroducing land-based theater nuclear weapons would restore balance
Growing Threats From Moscow and Beijing
According to a Congressional Research Service report, Russia remains the most immediate nuclear threat to the United States, with approximately 1,718 deployed warheads and a defense budget now exceeding 6.7% of GDP. New systems like the SS-X-29 Sarmat and the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle have sharply increased Moscow’s strategic options.
Meanwhile, President Putin has suspended New START participation and left the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty entirely—suggesting Russia may abandon traditional nuclear norms.
Simultaneously, China has accelerated its nuclear development beyond most estimates. A tweet from Indo-Pacific analysts reveals new silos and expanded deployments that hint at Beijing’s intention to match or surpass U.S. capabilities. This dual-peer threat marks the first time in history that Washington must deter two sophisticated nuclear competitors at once.
Strategic Gaps and Army’s Missing Role
The U.S. currently depends on the B-61 gravity bomb for tactical deterrence—hardly sufficient in an era of contested airspace and mobile threats. After the Cold War, the Army phased out its nuclear artillery and missiles, leaving a significant deterrence void. With Russia maintaining a non-strategic arsenal estimated to be ten times larger than the U.S.’s, adversaries may perceive a “nuclear gap” ripe for exploitation.
General Gregory Guillot has warned that these modern delivery systems “would significantly complicate the detection and characterization of an incoming nuclear attack, thus hindering the United States’ ability to respond effectively.”
Rebuilding Army Nuclear Capabilities
Supporters of restoring the Army’s nuclear role point to its Cold War success operating systems like the Lance and Pershing II missiles. New options being discussed include:
- Ground-Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs): Highly mobile and difficult to intercept, ideal for Europe.
- Ground-Launched Ballistic Missiles (GLBMs): Faster response and better suited for the Indo-Pacific.
- Nuclear-capable Precision Strike Missile (PrSM): A cost-effective way to repurpose an existing system.
One recent report even highlighted the Pentagon’s exploration of GLCM deployment, signaling the seriousness of this policy shift.
Strategic Risks and Rewards
Deploying new Army nuclear systems would offer several advantages: greater mobility, forward deterrence, and lower delivery costs. But challenges abound. Restoring command-and-control structures and ensuring secure handling would require massive reinvestment.
Arms control advocates warn this move could complicate future negotiations, especially as treaties like INF and New START unravel.
Still, land-based nuclear platforms could strengthen deterrence by giving U.S. allies visible assurance and making adversaries reconsider aggressive moves.
Ultimately, Washington faces a strategic crossroads. With peer nuclear adversaries expanding their arsenals and abandoning norms, rearming the Army may not be escalation—it may be essential rebalancing in an unstable world.
